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Abstract. We study the efﬁciency of bilateral liability-based contracts in managed secu-
rity services (MSSs). We model MSS as a collaborative service with the protection qual-
ity shaped by the contribution of both the service provider and the client. We adopt the
negligence concept from the legal profession to design two novel contracts: threshold-
based liability contract and variable liability contract.We ﬁnd that they can achieve the ﬁrst
best outcome when postbreach effort veriﬁcation is feasible. More importantly, they are
more efﬁcient than amultilateral contract when theMSS provider assumes limited liability.
Our results show that bilateral liability-based contracts can work in the real world. Hence,
more research is needed to explore their properties. We discuss the related implications.
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1. Introduction
The managed security services (MSSs) market has
grown by 10% in 2016, reaching an annual revenue of
$9.6 billion (Gartner 2017). Industry forecasts predict
that the MSS market may grow at a cumulative average
growth rate of 12% per year until 2020 (Technavio 2016).
However, outsourcing security protection via MSS does
not completely shield a ﬁrm from cyberattacks and
intrusions. For example, Target suffered from a massive
data breach in 2013, losing more than 100 million cus-
tomer records that cost the company $148 million
(Abrams 2014). Apparently, Target’s vendor, FireEye,
detected the security attack and alerted Target, but
Target failed to take action (Riley et al. 2014). This inci-
dent and countless other security breaches involving
MSSs highlight the challenges and risks of sharing se-
curity protection responsibility across multiple parties.
Despite these security incidents, the relationship be-
tween ﬁrms andMSS providers will likelymove toward
a more integrated partnership instead of just an out-
sourcing vendor-client relationship (Chuvakn 2014).
This closely knit collaborative relationship raises ques-
tions. How do we ensure that the client and the MSS
provider will both invest the necessary efforts to protect
the client’s system? What are the optimal pricing and
liability terms in MSS contracts?
Under a collaborative setting, the client and the MSS
provider naturally want each other to assume more
liability. The views on liability can differ greatly
depending on the perspective. Some practitioners hold
the view that the MSS provider should be held fully
accountable for the losses suffered by a client when there
is failure in protection (Bahirwani 2015). However, the
Target incident suggests that, in some cases, the client
should share part of the responsibility as well.
To explore the MSS landscape and practices, we sur-
vey some popular security service outsourcing contracts
in Table 1. Several features are common in these contracts.
All of them are bilateral between the client and the MSS
provider without involving any other parties. Further-
more, they include some liability terms under the service-
level agreements (SLAs), which specify the compensation
to the client in the event of a security breach. Some of
these compensations are provided on the condition that
the client takes prespeciﬁed actions, such as complying
with conﬁguration guidelines or maintaining the con-
nectivity of the security devices. Obviously, tomeet these
conditions, the MSS provider must be able to assess the
client’s effort after a security breach incident.
The MSS contracts in Table 1 are consistent with the
growing consensus on using liability terms to achieve
accountability (Hurley 2004, Lichtman and Posner
2006, Chandler 2010, Fisher 2013, Fryer et al. 2013).
The liability in these MSS contracts resembles the role
of warranty typically provided for durable products.
The difference here is that the quality of the service
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(i.e., the client’s state of security) is highly dependent on
both the client’s efforts and the MSS provider’s efforts.
To incentivize both the client and the MSS provider
to work hard via a bilateral contract, we need to verify
either the client’s effort or the MSS provider’s effort
after a security breach. This could be a costly under-
taking even with the proviso that advances in storage
and networking technologies and security auditing
have greatly enhanced the feasibility of tracking the
activities of the involved parties. With this backdrop,
it is important to design bilateral MSS contracts that
minimize the need for veriﬁcation while encouraging ef-
fort contribution by both the client and the MSS provider.
In this paper, we explore the optimal design of bi-
lateral liability-based contracts. We start with a simple
loss-based contract, which requires theMSS provider to
compensate the client fully in case of a security breach.
We then design other liability-based contracts with
different veriﬁcation requirements. In particular, the
legal profession assesses damage using the calculus of
Table 1. MSS Contract Examples
Provider Service SLA remedy Details
IBMa Managed protection service Loss based Premium incident prevention: compensate at
prenegotiated amount; others: compensate
a part of monthly fee
Network IDPS Threshold based Compensate a part of monthly fee only when the
client provides accurate contact and network/
server information
Network ﬁrewall
Security event and log
management
Uniﬁed threat management
Vulnerability management
Web security Threshold based Compensate a part of monthly fee only when the
client’s system conﬁguration complies with the
provided conﬁguration guideline
Email security
Dell SecureWorksb Managed ﬁrewall Threshold based Compensate 1/30th of monthly charge only when
the client complies with the stated customer
requirements, such as maintaining the health
and connectivity of the security device
Managed IPS
Security monitoring service
Policy compliance Loss based Compensate 1/30th of monthly charge
Vulnerability management
External penetration testing N/A Offer limited warranty
Symantecc MSS Loss based Compensate one service credit, which is
a percentage of daily charge
Verizond Managed web content service Threshold based Compensate a percentage of monthly recurring
charge only when the security service failure
is not caused by client-side fault, such as
customer-approved change in hardware or
software, or inaccurate contact information
Managed email content service
Managed intrusion protection
Managed PKI for remote access
DOS defense
Managed ﬁrewall Loss based and threshold
based
Availability: compensate one-day credit
Proactive notiﬁcation: compensate one-day credit
only when client’s contact information is
accurate
Trustwavee MSS Threshold based Compensate one-day charge only when the client
meets the stated obligation set forth
BTf MSS Threshold based Compensate at most 50% of monthly charge only
when the incident is not caused by the client
CenturyLinkg MSS Threshold based Compensate two-day charge only when the
service failure is not caused by the acts or
omissions of the client
Orange Business
Servicesh
Web protection suite Loss based Compensate a percentage of monthly service
charge
Note. DOS, denial-of-service; IDPS, intrusion detection and prevention systems; IPS, intrusion prevention systems; N/A, not available; PKI,
public key infrastructure.
aSee IBM’s contract documents: http://www-935.ibm.com/services/us/iss/html/contracts_worldwide_landing.html.
bSee Dell’s security services contract documents: http://www.dell.com/learn/us/en/04/service-contracts-security-services.
cSee Symantec’s contract documents: http://www.symantec.com/business/support/index?page=content&id=TECH131855.
dSee Verizon’s security services contract documents: http://www.verizonenterprise.com/terms/us/products/security/.
eSee Trustwave’s MSS SLA: https://www3.trustwave.com/SLA/Ver001_Trustwave_MSS_SLA.PDF.
fSee BT’s Convergent Solutions Contract: https://www2.bt.com/static/i/media/pdf/ip_converge_service_schedule.pdf.
gSee CenturyLink’s MSS SLA: http://www.centurylink.com/legal/docs/Managed-Security-Service.pdf.
hSee Orange Business Service’s Web Protection Suite SLA: http://www.orange-business.com/ﬁles/media/contributor_en/sla.web_protection
_suite.gbl_.06-13.pdf.
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negligence (the “Hand rule”) from the tort literature
(Rustad and Koenig 2007, Naldi et al. 2013). Compar-
ative negligence allocates liability on the basis of the
proportion of damage caused by the plaintiff and de-
fendant, whereas contributory negligence allocates lia-
bility to the plaintiff when he or she is deemed to have
contributed to the damage (Cooter and Ulen 1986).
Using these two negligence concepts, we design two
liability-based contracts: variable liability contract and
threshold-based liability contract.
The variable liability contract follows the spirit of
comparative negligence and assigns the liability based
on the effort invested by the client. In other words, the
compensation received by the client in the event of
a security breach is proportional to the effort that she
invests. By contrast, the threshold-based liability contract
follows the spirit of contributory negligence. Under this
contract, the client will receive compensation if and
only if her effort exceeds a certain threshold.
These two types of contracts involve different as-
sessment and veriﬁcation requirements before and
after security breaches. A variable liability contract
requires the MSS provider to have a full account of the
client’s protection effort after a breach has occurred.
Hence, it is demanding in terms of postbreach veriﬁ-
cation. A threshold-based liability contract does not
require such extensive veriﬁcation. Instead, it only
requires judging whether the client’s effort has excee-
ded a predeﬁned threshold, which is simpler in terms
of postbreach veriﬁcation (compared with a detailed
audit of all actions undertaken by the client). However,
to construct a threshold-based liability contract, the
client and the MSS provider have to predetermine the
threshold effort needed from the client. This is not a
trivial task.
We analytically compare the performance of loss-
based contract, variable liability contract, and threshold-
based liability contract in terms of the ability to induce
effort investments from the client and the MSS pro-
vider. We ﬁnd that only variable liability contract and
threshold-based liability contract can lead to socially
optimal outcomes. We then assess the performance of
these two contracts under different real-world con-
straints (viz the presence of postbreach veriﬁcation
errors and the assumption of limited liability). We ﬁnd
that threshold-based liability contract performs better
than variable liability contract in these settings. We
conclude the analysis by comparing these two liability-
based contracts with a multilateral loss-based contract,
which also leads to socially optimal effort investments
without the need for postbreach veriﬁcation (Lee et al.
2013). We show that the two liability-based contracts
suffer less effort distortion than the multilateral loss-
based contract under limited liability.
This study makes three important contributions.
First, it incorporates the negligence concept from the
legal profession in designing novel bilateral contracts
that can help induce socially optimal outcomes in MSS
settings. Second, it illustrates that, even with postbreach
effort veriﬁcation, nuanced design of the contract terms
could still lead to different extents of inefﬁciency when
the market encompasses realistic constraints, such as
limited liability or veriﬁcation errors. Third, it provides
a theoretical basis for exploring the optimal design of
MSS contracts in other complex settings, such as the
presence of strategic hackers or collaborative multiparty
security protection (Cavusoglu et al. 2009).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
reviews the related literature. Section 3 presents the
model, particularly the two bilateral liability-based
contracts. It also considers the scenario with effort
veriﬁcation errors. Section 4 checks the robustness of
our results with interdependent clients. Section 5 ap-
plies our model to several security conﬁgurations and
breach scenarios. Section 6 considers the scenario with
limited liability and compares the performance of the
bilateral liability-based contracts with a multilateral
loss-based contract. Section 7 discusses and concludes
the paper.
2. Literature Review
This research is related to prior studies on pricing
models in information systems outsourcing contracts
(Gopal et al. 2003, Dey et al. 2010, Mani et al. 2012). In
general, we can consider loss-based contract as one
type of ﬁxed price contract that is contingent on ser-
vice outcome, whereas variable liability contract and
threshold-based liability contract are similar to variable
price contracts (Roels et al. 2010). For these pricing
contracts, adding nonprice provisions, such as an
extendibility clause, could be an effective means of
promoting efﬁciency (Susarla et al. 2010). Our setting
deviates from these pricing studies in that both the
client’s efforts and the MSS provider’s efforts con-
tribute to shaping the security of the system (compared
with a typical outsourcing contract, where the outcome
depends only on the service provider’s effort).
In particular, our focus on bilateral protection efforts
follows the same spirit as previous studies on collab-
orative contributions, such as software engineering
(Jayanth et al. 2011), collaborative services (Roels et al.
2010), product design (Bhattacharya et al. 2014), and
information security outsourcing (Lee et al. 2013).
A common feature in these settings is the presence of
information asymmetry on both sides of the market,
giving rise to double moral hazard (Cooper and Ross
1985, Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine 1995). It is well
known that ﬁrst best outcomes are not achievable when
the efforts from the two involved parties are not con-
tractible. To induce the client and the service provider
to exert socially optimal efforts, we need to add ad-
ditional features or requirements to the context.
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Oneway is to add some third parties. Lee et al. (2013)
propose amultilateral contract where theMSS provider
has to compensate some third parties, such as other
MSS clients or designated beneﬁciaries, when a focal
client’s system is compromised. With this contract, the
breached client will not receive any compensation,
whereas the MSS provider has to pay a compensation
for security breaches. Hence, both of them have in-
centives to invest in protection. This solution is theo-
retically sound and follows the same spirit as the
“nonbalanced” or surplus loss schemes in the principal
agent model (Kambhu 1982, Emons 1988). However,
negotiating for such multilateral arrangements is not
trivial in the real world, especially when it requires the
MSS provider to compensate other parties unrelated to
the security incident. None of the contracts surveyed in
Table 1 involve multilateral arrangements.
Another way to encourage protection is to increase
the uncertainty of the payoff. In particular, the use of
liability schemes can induce efﬁcient outcomeswhen the
client needs to incur a loss even with compensation.
The intuition is that the threat of incurring a loss because
of the uncertain compensation would incentivize the
principal (in our case, the MSS client) from shirking.
However, previous analysis has shown that toomuch or
too little uncertainty in the compensation does not in-
duce the efﬁcient outcomes (Mann and Wissink 1988).
Our research differs from these two streams of work
in that we focus on bilateral instead of multilateral
contracts and do not incorporate a random component
in the outcome. Instead, we base our contract design on
the negligence concept from the tort literature. The
essential idea is that a fault determination mechanism
can induce the potential injurer and victim to take
precaution against a crime (Green 1976, Cooter and
Ulen 1986, Rubinfeld 1987). For our bilateral contracts
to work, we need one extra assumption: namely, the
client’s effort is veriﬁable after the security breach. This
assumption is similar to the auditing requirement in
Bhattacharya et al. (2014), where ex post knowledge
facilitates the choice of contracts with different com-
pensations. We further compare the efﬁciency of dif-
ferent bilateral liability-based contracts with varying
veriﬁcation requirements and under real-world con-
straints, such as limited liability and effort veriﬁcation
errors, andwithmultilateral contracts similar to the one
proposed by Lee et al. (2013).
More broadly, this research is related to prior works
on MSS design and conﬁguration, such as the optimal
ways to outsource prevention and detection functions
(Cezar et al. 2014), when outsourcing security is better
than cyber insurance (Zhao et al. 2013), choice of MSS
networks or consortia (Gupta and Zhdanov 2012),
pricing of MSSs in relation to transaction costs (Ding
and Yurcik 2005), and how a client’s outsourcing de-
cision relates to the risks of the MSS provider going
bankrupt (Ding and Yurcik 2006) or the performance of
the outsourcing contract (Ding et al. 2005). We extend
this literature by studying the economic efﬁciency of
a speciﬁc tool (viz bilateral liability-based contracts).
3. The Model
We consider an MSS provider offering a service con-
tract to a client. The client will protect her system jointly
with the provider if she accepts the contract. Otherwise,
she has to undertake the protection herself. The contract
lasts for a ﬁxed period (often one year in the industry).
The client’s system faces a probability of security breach,
which depends on three factors: the attack rate a∈ [0, 1],
the client’s protection effort qk ∈ [0, 1], and the provider’s
protection effort qs ∈ [0, 1]. Let the breach probability
be @(a, qk, qs) ∈ [0, 1], which is nonincreasing and con-
vex in the client’s efforts and the MSS provider’s efforts
(i.e., ∂@/∂qk ≤ 0, ∂@/∂qs ≤ 0, ∂2@/∂q2k ≥ 0, and ∂2@/
∂q2s ≥ 0). The convexity in breach probability captures
diminishing marginal returns in security protection
(Moitra and Konda 2000, Gordon and Loeb 2002).
The client’s and the MSS provider’s costs of pro-
tection, #k(qk) ≥ 0 and #s(qs) ≥ 0, are increasing and
convex in effort (i.e., ∂#k/∂qk > 0, ∂#s/∂qs > 0, ∂2#k/
∂q2k ≥ 0, and ∂2#s/∂q2s ≥ 0). For example, the client needs
to deploy more workers if she wants to monitor a se-
curity operations center 24 hours a day and seven days
aweek instead of only during the ofﬁce hours. TheMSS
provider also needs to incur a higher cost if it provides
real time incident response service. We do not consider
ﬁxed cost because it may depend on the size of the
client ﬁrm or the market or on the progress of tech-
nological development, none of which are the focus of
this study.
The client enjoys a utility, v> 0, if her system is not
breached and zero utility otherwise. The contract in-
cludes a compensation term, β∈ [0, 1], in the SLA. The
MSS provider will compensate the client by βv if the
client has contracted its service and her system is
breached within the contract period. We study a static
game where the client and the MSS provider make
a single set of decisions—whether to collaborate in the
protection, how much effort to invest in protecting the
client’s system, and the price and compensation terms
involved. With a static game, we can interpret all
functions and parameters as summary measures of
what the client and the MSS provider expect through-
out the game (Varian 2004, Grossklags et al. 2008,
Lee et al. 2013). Table 2 lists the notations used in
this paper.
We assume that all model functions and parame-
ters are public knowledge, which is customary in the
economics of information security literature (Gordon
and Loeb 2002, Lee et al. 2013). Before investing in
information security, ﬁrms often conduct risk as-
sessment to estimate their vulnerabilities and measure
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the costs and beneﬁts of protection (Czarnik 2014,
van Kessel and Allan 2014). For instance, they may
determine breach probability by assessing the likeli-
hood of threat event occurrence based on adversary
intent, capability, and targeting together with the
likelihood of nonadversarial threat event occurrence
based on historical evidence and empirical data (NIST
2012). Note that our objective is to compare different
liability-based MSS contracts. As is customary in eco-
nomic analyses of outsourcing (Aksin et al. 2008,
Dey et al. 2010, Jain et al. 2013), the precise measure-
ment of the parameters and the construction of the
contract terms are of secondary importance.
We ﬁrst establish two benchmarks, the social plan-
ner’s problem and in-house protection, that help assess
the performance of the liability-based contracts later.
3.1. Social Planner’s Problem
The social planner’s objective function is
w  [1 −@(a, qk, qs)]v − [#k(qk) + #s(qs)], (1)
where [1 −@(a, qk, qs)]v is the expected value of the
system with protection and [#k(qk) + #s(qs)] is the total
cost of protection. The ﬁrst-order conditions are
∂w
∂qk
−∂@
∂qk
v − ∂#k
∂qk
 0, (2)
∂w
∂qs
−∂@
∂qs
v − ∂#s
∂qs
 0. (3)
We consider only interior solutions, Q*k and Q
*
s, which
represent the client’s and the MSS provider’s ﬁrst best
efforts. Realistically, perfect security is unachievable.
The cost of attaining an extreme level of security can
outweigh the system’s beneﬁt, which is perhaps why
information security professionals advocate balanc-
ing the portfolio of risk control strategies to include
risk mitigation and transference in addition to risk
reduction and prevention (Tipton and Krause 2007,
Goldstein and Sood 2014).
With an interior solution, the ﬁrst best efforts must
satisfy Equations (2) and (3); that is,
−v ∂@
∂qk
∣∣∣∣(Q*k ,Q*s) 
∂#k
∂qk
∣∣∣∣
Q*k
, (4)
−v ∂@
∂qs
∣∣∣∣(Q*k ,Q*s) 
∂#s
∂qs
∣∣∣∣
Q*s
. (5)
Equations (4) and (5) suggest that the optimal social
welfare is attained when the marginal beneﬁt of pro-
tection equals marginal cost of protection. One notable
challenge here is that the marginal beneﬁt of protec-
tion involves another party’s effort, meaning that co-
ordination is necessary.
3.2. In-House Protection
If the client declines the MSS provider’s service, then
she has to develop the security protection in house. qs
becomes zero, and her expected utility from in-house
protection is
u0  [1 −@(a, qk, 0)]v − #k(qk). (6)
The client’s reservation utilityU0* is the maximum value
of u0 (i.e.,U*0  maxqk u0). This reservation utility serves
as the reference for the client to decide whether to
outsource.
3.3. Liability-Based Contracts
We now analyze the contractual agreement between
the client and the MSS provider. TheMSS provider ﬁrst
decides the contract price p and compensation rate β.
If the client accepts the offer, then both she and the
provider will put in efforts independently without
knowing each other’s effort. This resembles the case
in the real world because, ex ante, before any security
incident occurs, ﬁrms may lack the expertise or re-
sources to verify the MSS provider’s security effort or
Table 2. Notations
Symbol Deﬁnition
m Number of clients in the market
a Attack rate to a client’s system
v Payoff of a client’s system
Functions
@ Breach probability
#k Client’s protection cost
#s MSS provider’s protection cost
Decisions
qk Client’s protection effort
p Contract price
βˆ. Conditional compensation rate
β˜ Variable liability constant
qs MSS provider’s protection effort
β Compensation rate
T Effort requirement (threshold)
Objectives
w Social welfare
u0 Client’s utility from in-house protection
u1 Client’s utility from outsourcing
π MSS provider’s proﬁt
Benchmarks
W* First best social welfare
U*0 Client’s reservation utility
Q*k First best protection effort for client
Q*s First best protection effort for MSS provider
Extensions
e Interdependency risk coefﬁcient
λk Client’s weight of protection
ck Client’s unit cost of protection
γ Liability upper bound
Qsbk Second best protection effort for the client
+i Loss function with interdependency risk
λs MSS provider’s weight of protection
cs MSS provider’s unit cost of protection
φ Price cap
Qsbs Second best protection effort for the MSS provider
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quality (Schneier 2002, Ashford 2012). The expected
utility from outsourcing for the client is
u1  [1 −@(a, qk, qs)(1 − β)]v − #k(qk) − p. (7)
The MSS provider’s proﬁt from serving the client is
π  p −@(a, qk, qs)βv − #s(qs). (8)
Because both u1 and π are concave, the client will
maximize her utility based on the ﬁrst-order condition
of (7):
∂u1
∂qk
−∂@
∂qk
v − ∂#k
∂qk
+ ∂(@β)
∂qk
v  0. (9)
Similarly, the MSS provider will maximize its proﬁt
based on the ﬁrst-order condition of (8):
∂π
∂qs
−∂(@β)
∂qs
v − ∂#s
∂qs
 0. (10)
By comparing with the social planner’s problem in
Section 3.1 (i.e., juxtaposing (2) with (9) and (3) with
(10)), the sufﬁcient conditions for a contract to induce
socially optimal efforts are
∂(@β)
∂qk
 0, (11)
∂(@β)
∂qs
 ∂@
∂qs
. (12)
Equation (11) says that the expected compensation
rate @β must be independent of the client’s effort.
Equation (12) says that the expected compensation rate
and breach probability must have the same rate of
change with respect to the MSS provider’s effort. These
conditions align the client’s and the MSS provider’s
incentives by imposing liability for security breach on
the MSS provider and restricting the compensation to
the client. They form the cornerstone in designing op-
timal MSS contracts when the client and the MSS pro-
vider need to join effort in protecting the client’s system.
Unlike the compensation rate, the contract price does
not affect the equilibrium efforts. This is because the
price is simply a means of rent allocation between the
client and the MSS provider, which is not important for
social welfare consideration. Because the MSS provider
is offering a monopoly service, it will extract all surplus
from the client. However, for the client to outsource,
her expected utility must not be smaller than her res-
ervation utility; therefore, wemust have u1  U*0, which
is a constant. Because social welfare is the sum of the
client’s and the MSS provider’s utility (i.e., w  π + u1),
the MSS provider’s problem is identical to the social
planner’s problem, giving rise to the following result.1
Lemma 1. The MSS provider will choose a contract that
maximizes the social welfare.
Lemma 1 is consistent with previous studies (Lee
et al. 2013, Zhao et al. 2013). Although the MSS pro-
vider’s and social planner’s interests are aligned, we
may not get the ﬁrst best outcome because the client
may not choose the efﬁcient protection after out-
sourcing.We next analyze three bilateral liability-based
contracts and show that only two of them can lead to
the ﬁrst best outcome.
3.3.1. Loss-Based Liability. With a loss-based liability
contract, the MSS provider compensates the client by a
constant rate, β∈ [0, 1], if the client’s system is breached
after contracting its service. Referring to Table 1, this
type of contract is common in the information security
industry, where the MSS provider assumes an uncon-
ditional liability for the breach of the client’s system. It is
akin to the “no questions asked” type of warranty or
insurance services offered in some conventional mar-
kets (e.g., rental car insurance).
The compensation rate is determined by the MSS
provider and hence becomes a constant by the time
that the client decides how much effort to invest. The
sufﬁcient conditions for optimal social welfare, (11)
and (12), require β  0 or ∂@/∂qk  0 and β  1 or
∂@/∂qs  0. Suppose that ∂@/∂qk  0. From (2), ∂w/∂qk
becomes −∂#k/∂qk < 0, meaning that social welfare is
decreasing in the client’s effort. Hence, the optimal
client effortQ*k  0. Similarly, suppose that ∂@/∂qs  0.
From (3), ∂w/∂qs becomes −∂#s/∂qs < 0, meaning that
the optimal MSS provider effort Q*s  0. This implies
that the client will not outsource to the MSS provider.
These results violate our assumption of interior ﬁrst
best efforts. In fact, if ∂@/∂qk  0 or ∂@/∂qs  0, the
protection can be optimally handled by a single agent.
Such a problem has been well studied in the prior lit-
erature (Dey et al. 2010, Fitoussi and Gurbaxani 2012).
Hence, we do not consider the case with either ∂@/
∂qk  0 or ∂@/∂qs  0. The social welfare maximization
conditions, (11) and (12), then require β  0 and
β  1, which are obviously contradictory. This implies
that a loss-based liability contract is always inefﬁcient.
Our ﬁrst proposition follows.
Proposition 1. When it is optimal for the client and the
MSS provider to invest in security protection, the ﬁrst best
social welfare is not achievable with a loss-based liability
contract.
Proposition 1 is consistent with the literature show-
ing that a loss-based liability contract is not efﬁcient in
a collaborative security protection setting (Lee et al.
2013). This is because assigning liability to only one
party cannot induce the other party to work hard. Here,
a high compensation rate encourages the client to shirk,
but a low compensation rate encourages the MSS pro-
vider to shirk.
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Nevertheless, when either Q*k  0 or Q*s  0, a loss-
based liability contract can be efﬁcient. An example
is the “best shot” protection, with which the breach
probability (e.g., @  a[1 −max(qk, qs)]) depends only
on the highest effort put in by the two involved parties
(Varian 2004, Grossklags et al. 2008). The ﬁrst best
outcome can be achieved by letting the party with the
highest beneﬁt-cost ratio do all of the protection. For
example, if the MSS provider has a cost advantage, a
loss-based liability contract with β  1 is socially efﬁcient.
With this kind of conﬁguration, however, the problem
again reduces to a single-agent protection problem
without involving collaboration.
Given the inefﬁciency of a loss-based liability con-
tract, how can we incentivize the client and the MSS
provider to contribute ﬁrst best efforts? One solution
is to introduce a third party. This is the spirit of the
multilateral contract proposed by Lee et al. (2013),
which requires the MSS provider to pay other clients
but not the one whose system is breached. In the model
by Lee et al. (2013), the clients will receive a “subsidy”
from the MSS provider and the breached client if their
own systems are not breached. This way, the MSS
provider’s compensation is redistributed to some other
third parties, but the clients have to work hard because
their payoff is directly tied to the security of their own
systems. Another example of a multilateral solution is
“reverse insurance,” where a third party (usually the
government) gives a lump sum payment amounting to
the expected loss from a security breach to the client
ﬁrst; then the MSS provider compensates the third
party when a security breach occurs.
Although a multilateral solution can induce optimal
efforts in a collaborative setting, the need for a third
party and transfer payments between the involved
players is demanding. The transfer payments may also
incur transaction costs and therefore could be socially
costly. Here we explore if we can induce optimal efforts
from the client and the MSS provider without enlisting
a third party.
3.3.2. Variable Liability. We now consider a contract
that distributes the liability between the MSS provider
and the victim based on the extent of the victim’s
negligence (or effort). This type of liability allocation is
related to the concept of comparative negligence in tort
law. The compensation function is usually a monotonic
transformation of the client’s effort. The higher effort
the client has invested, the more compensation she will
receive. This type of contract is commonly used in
insurance (e.g., Shavell 1979), and it adheres to the
principle of proportionality in legal practice. The idea is
akin to the use of variable rewards in security man-
agement. Nowadays, many ﬁrms offer “bug bounty”
programs to reward white hat hackers for reporting
security loopholes and patches. The reward is mostly
tied to the severity of the vulnerability and complexity
of the solution. For example, Google runs a Patch
Rewards Program that offers $5,000 for moderately
complex patches and $10,000 for sophisticated improve-
ments in security (Kirk 2014).
Note that to distribute the liability between the MSS
provider and the client, we need to assume that the cli-
ent’s effort is observable after the security breach. This is
a realistic assumption because many organizations today
keep detailed audit trails that can facilitate postbreach
investigation using computer forensic techniques. It is
also consistentwith real-world observations. For example,
the Target incident indicates that postbreach investigation
can pin down the negligence of the outsourcing client.
Premera Blue Cross, one of the largest health insurance
providers in the state of Washington, was sued after
a data breach incident in 2014 (Viebeck 2015). Federal
auditors hadwarned the company threeweeks before the
breach about inadequate security procedures. The evi-
dence could eventually determine whether Premera Blue
Cross was negligent in its own protection.
When β depends on qk, Equation (11) expands to
@∂β/∂qk + β∂@/∂qk  0, which is a ﬁrst-order linear
ordinary differential equation with solution β  β˜/@,
where β˜ is a constant. By Lemma 1, the MSS pro-
vider prefers the ﬁrst best outcome. Hence, it would
choose qs  Q*s and then incentivize the client to exert
the ﬁrst best effort through a proper construction of the
function β  β˜/@(a, qk,Q*s) that satisﬁes Equations (11)
and (12). This inverse proportionality between the
compensation rate and breach probability follows the
insurance literature, which addresses the moral hazard
problem by designing an insurance coverage that equals
the premium divided by the probability of having an
accident (Shavell 1979). With this design, the expected
coverage, which is the probability of having an adverse
incident times the coverage, is always a constant.
Following a similar spirit, by Equation (12), β  1,
meaning that the MSS provider simply needs to set β˜ 
@(a,Q*k,Q*s) to induce the ﬁrst best effort from the client.
Accordingly, the optimal compensation rate that sat-
isﬁes Equations (11) and (12) at (Q*k,Q*s) is
β  @(a,Q
*
k,Q
*
s)
@(a, qk,Q*s)
, (13)
where the numerator is the breach probability with
efﬁcient protection and the denominator is the breach
probability given that qs  Q*s and the client’s actual
effort. Our next proposition follows.
Proposition 2. The ﬁrst best social welfare is achievable
with a variable liability contract by setting the optimal-to-
actual breach probability ratio as the compensation rate.
The expected compensation rate @β equals the
breach probability with efﬁcient protection, which is
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a constant. This means that the client will not get extra
beneﬁt by reducing her effort because theMSS provider
can penalize her according to the extent of her un-
derinvestment. However, it may be difﬁcult to
implement a variable liability contract in practice be-
cause detailed assessment of security effort could be
unduly complex. This is especially the case when the
client is desperate in ﬁghting the attack—useful data
could be lost during the process, and the MSS provider
may have little time to audit the client’s effort. Recent
analysis suggests that some distributed denial-of-service
(DDoS) attacks are launched to distract the incident
response team so that it cannot discover other hidden
and more sophisticated attacks (Kolochenko 2015).
Such attack tactics make postbreach effort veriﬁca-
tion an even more difﬁcult task.
3.3.3. Threshold-based Liability. Supposing that post-
breach veriﬁcation is difﬁcult or costly, we next con-
sider another contract that allocates the breach liability
based on whether the client has invested enough effort
(the “threshold”) to protect her system. This idea is
similar to the concept of contributory negligence in tort
law, which denies a victim from getting compensation
if her damage is partly caused by her own negligence.
Such threshold contracts seem to be common in
the information technology (IT) industry. Referring to
Table 1, IBM’s SLA stipulates that if the client’s contact
information, network, or server was changed without
notifying IBM in advance, any failure in detecting and
reporting security incidents could be taken as an omis-
sion of the client and void the compensation (IBM 2008).
Formally, in a threshold-based liability contract, a
compensation is provided only when the client’s effort
exceeds a prespeciﬁed threshold T ∈ (0, 1]. Speciﬁcally,
β  βˆ1qk≥T 
{
βˆ qk ≥T,
0 qk <T,
βˆ∈ (0, 1], (14)
where βˆ is the compensation rate conditional on the
client meeting the threshold. If a security breach occurs
and the client’s effort is found to be smaller than T, then
the compensation rate β  0. The MSS provider’s ﬁrst-
order condition in Equation (10) then becomes ∂π/∂qs 
−∂#s/∂qs < 0, meaning that it will invest zero effort.
This means that the client will be better off choosing
in-house protection. Hence, if the client chooses to
outsource, she should invest at least T effort. Then
Equation (12) will reduce to βˆ  1, meaning that the
MSS provider should offer full compensation. This,
however, violates Equation (11) because ∂@/∂qk ≠ 0.
Furthermore, following Equation (9), ∂u1/∂qk will re-
duce to −∂#k/∂qk < 0, and hence, the client’s utility will
decrease with her effort. Therefore, the client will invest
exactly T and not more than T effort. Taken together,
the threshold-based liability contract is efﬁcient with
T  Q*k and βˆ  1, conditional on the client meeting the
threshold effort (i.e., Q*k).
Proposition 3. The ﬁrst best social welfare is achievable
with a threshold-based liability contract by setting the cli-
ent’s ﬁrst best effort as the threshold and providing condi-
tional full compensation.
With loss-based liability, a high compensation would
induce theMSS provider but not the client towork hard.
With threshold-based liability, other than the compen-
sation (which incentivizes the MSS provider to work
hard), a threshold is used to force the client to put in the
ﬁrst best effort. Essentially, theMSS provider sets up the
protection efforts for itself and the client. For such
a contract to work, we need to add an additional con-
tract term specifying the minimum protection from the
clients.
3.4. Effort Veriﬁcation Error
In the analysis in Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3, we assume that
the MSS provider can verify the client’s effort after the
security breach. Realistically, this effort veriﬁcation
could be costly and hence, erroneous because of strategic
behavior of the attacker or the quality of the auditor. For
example, the attacker may deliberately remove the log
ﬁles and all traces of the attack and protection to cover
their paths (Graves 2010). In such a case, the client’s
effort may be understated in the audit report if the se-
curity conﬁgurations or policies are modiﬁed. To criti-
cally compare the performance of the variable liability
contract and the threshold-based liability contract, we
introduce an error so that the audited client’s effort after
the breach q˘k follows a uniform distribution with limit
[qk − ε, qk], where ε is a small error.Note thatwe assume
the audited effort does not exceed the actual effort be-
cause effort estimation is often conservative. For instance,
the auditor may verify only the security operations
contained in a checklist. It may omit the efforts invested
beyond the checklist, leading to underestimation of the
invested effort.
Recall from Section 3.3.2 that to achieve the efﬁcient
outcome with a variable liability contract, the expected
compensation rate @β must equal the breach proba-
bility with the efﬁcient protection, which is a constant.
With veriﬁcation errors, for qk ≥ ε, the expected com-
pensation rate accounting for breach probability is
E(@β) 
∫ qk
qk−ε
@(a, qk, qs)β(qk)
ε
dqk
 @
ε
[G(qk) − G(qk − ε)], (15)
where
G(qk) 
∫
β(qk)dqk (16)
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and ∂G/∂qk  β. Equation (15) results because the ac-
tual breach probability @(a, qk, qs) and the error limit ε
do not depend on the audited client effort qk; hence, they
can be taken out of the integral. In most cases, the term
@[G(qk) − G(qk − ε)] in Equation (15) depends on qk,
which means that the client’s effort will always in-
ﬂuence the expected compensation rate. This violates
the necessary condition for efﬁciency in Equation (13).
Accordingly, the variable liability contract will mostly
not give the efﬁcient outcome when effort veriﬁcation
errors exist.2
With threshold-based liability, the expected com-
pensation rate with effort veriﬁcation errors is
E(β)  S
∫ qk
qk−ε
1qk≥T
βˆ
ε
dqk. (17)
If we apply the outcome from the case without veri-
ﬁcation errors (i.e., T Q*k, βˆ  1, and qk  Q*k), the
expected compensation will become zero. This will
change the outcome because the MSS provider will
always shirkwhen it expects to pay zero compensation.
To address this, we can reduce the threshold to some
T  Q*k − ε so that the expected compensation rate
will remain 100% at qk  Q*k. In this case, the client
may still get compensation when the audited effort
qk >Q*k − ε. Speciﬁcally, given T Q*k − ε, βˆ  1, and
qk ∈ [Q*k− ε,Q*k], the expected compensation rate will
become
E(β) 
∫ qk
qk−ε
1qk≥Q*k−ε
1
ε
dqk  1 −Q
*
k − qk
ε
. (18)
To ensure that the client does not deviate from the
efﬁcient effort, her utility should be increasing in
qk ∈ [Q*k − ε,Q*k]. Note that the client’s utility is concave
in this region,
∂2u1
∂q2k
 −
(
Q*k − qk
ε
)
∂2@
∂q2k
v − ∂
2#k
∂q2k
+ ∂@
∂qk
v
ε
< 0, (19)
and it is always increasing beyond qk  Q*k − ε,
∂u1
∂qk
∣∣∣∣∣(Q*k−ε)+
 −∂@
∂qk
v − ∂#k
∂qk
+@v
ε
> 0. (20)
Now consider the ﬁrst-order derivative of the utility
below qk  Q*k,
∂u1
∂qk
∣∣∣∣∣(Q*k)−
 − ∂#k
∂qk
+@v
ε
, (21)
the sign of which depends on the error. When this
derivative is also positive, the client’s utility will always
increase in qk ∈ [Q*k − ε,Q*k], meaning that shewill choose
qk  Q*k. Therefore, the socially optimal condition in a
threshold-based liability contract with effort veriﬁcation
errors is
ε<
@v
∂#k/∂qk
∣∣∣∣∣(Q*k ,Q*s)
 @−∂@/∂qk
∣∣∣∣∣(Q*k ,Q*s)
≡ εˆ. (22)
The upper bound εˆ that maintains the client’s incentive
to contribute qk  Q*k depends on the scale of the breach
probability relative to the client’s protection efﬁciency at
the socially optimal level of protection. If the breach
probability is high or the client’s protection is less efﬁ-
cient, then εˆ will increase, meaning that the threshold-
based liability contract can tolerate more error because
the client’s effort is less inﬂuential. In the extreme case, if
εˆ≥Q*k, the threshold-based liability contract is efﬁcient
even if the error is large. The MSS provider can simply
grant a compensation when the client’s effort is positive.
Note that the effort veriﬁcation error introduces
payoff uncertainty to the client. Prior research has shown
that such payoff uncertainty could incentivize the client
to contribute effort and lead to socially optimal outcomes
in some settings (Mann and Wissink 1988). Here we
show that this is indeed the case with threshold-based
liability contract but not with variable liability contract.
To conclude this section, we ﬁnd that threshold-based
liability contract is more resilient to error in the sense
that it can still lead to the socially optimal outcome
when the realized veriﬁcation error is not excessively
large. It is also easier to implement than a variable lia-
bility contract because it requires less postbreach veri-
ﬁcation. It is perhaps not surprising that it is more
preferred as shown in Table 1. In the remaining analysis,
we focus on the threshold-based liability contract. The
corresponding analysis for the variable liability contract
is available in the online appendix.
4. Interdependent Clients
We now examine the performance of the variable lia-
bility contract and the threshold-based liability contract
in another extension (viz when the clients are inter-
connected because of the outsourcing) (Hui et al. 2013).
Realistically, when multiple computer systems are
connected to a single hub, additional risks may arise
because the hub introduces a single point of failure. The
damage from the breach of one system may propagate
to the other systems on the same network. An example is
the Dark Seoul incident onMarch 20, 2013, in Korea. The
attacker spread a malware via the patch management
system of AhnLab, a security software provider, with
compromised user accounts to AhnLab’s other clients
(Schwartz 2013). In general, collaborative MSSs may
create negative externalities among the clients because
the compromise of any one client’s system may cause
inconvenience to the entire network because of post-
breach investigation and system reconciliation. This
type of propagated risk is also prevalent in software
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as a service (August et al. 2014) or, more broadly, any
connected systems (Zhao et al. 2013).
To incorporate this system interdependency risk, we
consider a market with m homogeneous clients. We
assume that a breached client in the MSS provider’s
network will cause all other clients in the same network
to incur an expected loss: ev, e≤ 1. We further assume
this loss to be sufﬁciently small so that themarket is fully
covered, which means that serving the mth client yields
a nonnegative marginal proﬁt to the MSS provider. The
expected utility from in-house protectionwill remain the
same as in (6) because clients who do not outsource will
not be affected by the outsourcing clients and the MSS
provider. Hence, the clients’ reservation utility is stillU*0.
The social welfare now becomes
w  ∑m
i1
[(1 −+i)v − #k(qki) − #s(qsi)], (23)
where +j  @(a, qkj, qsj) + e∑mi1,i≠ j@(a, qki, qsi). Similar
to the baseline model in Section 3, the ﬁrst best efforts
with the externalities (Q*ke,Q*se) should satisfy the ﬁrst-
order conditions of (23):
−[1 + e(m − 1)]v ∂@
∂qkj
∣∣∣∣∣(Q*ke,Q*se)
 ∂#k
∂qkj
∣∣∣∣∣
Q*ke
, (24)
−[1 + e(m − 1)]v ∂@
∂qsj
∣∣∣∣∣(Q*ke ,Q*se)
 ∂#s
∂qsj
∣∣∣∣∣
Q*se
. (25)
Comparing these ﬁrst-order conditions with those
from the baseline model (i.e., (4) with (24) and (5)
with (25)), the main difference is that the marginal
beneﬁt is now multiplied by [1 + e(m − 1)] when inter-
dependency risk is present.
With outsourcing, client j’s expected utility is
u1j  v − (1 − βj)+jv − #k(qkj) − pj, (26)
and the MSS provider’s total proﬁt from serving the m
clients is
π  ∑m
i1
[pi − βi+iv − #s(qsi)]. (27)
Here again, the client will maximize her utility based
on the ﬁrst-order condition of (26):
∂u1j
∂qkj
 −(1 − βj)
∂@
∂qkj
v ++j
∂βj
∂qkj
v − ∂#k
∂qkj
 0. (28)
The MSS provider will maximize its proﬁt based on
the m ﬁrst-order conditions of (27):
∂π
∂qsj
 −
(
βj + e
∑m
i1,i≠j
βi
)
∂@
∂qsj
v −+j
∂βj
∂qsj
v − ∂#s
∂qsj
 0,
j  1. . .m. (29)
By comparing (24) with (28) and (25) with (29), the
liability contract leads to socially optimal outcomes
when the following sufﬁcient conditions are satisﬁed
at (Q*ke,Q*se):
+j
∂βj
∂qkj
 −[βj + e(m − 1)]
∂@
∂qkj
, (30)
+j
∂βj
∂qsj

[
(1 − βj) + e
∑m
i1,i≠j
(1 − βi)
]
∂@
∂qsj
. (31)
Condition (31) depends on the compensations made
to the other clients. With homogeneous clients, the
MSS provider will offer the same contract to all cli-
ents (i.e., βi  βj). Equation (31) then simpliﬁes to
+j∂βj/∂qsj  (1 − βj)[1 + e(m − 1)]∂@/∂qsj.
With a loss-based liability contract, Equations (30)
and (31) can be simpliﬁed to βj  −e(m − 1) and βj  1
because the compensation rate βj is a constant,
∂@/∂qkj≠ 0, and ∂@/∂qsj≠ 0. These two conditions are
contradictory because −e(m − 1)< 0. This implies that
loss-based liability contract continues to be inefﬁcient
with system interdependency risk.
Interestingly, condition (30) suggests that the client
should pay compensation to the other clients when
a breach occurs because βj  −e(m − 1)< 0. This coun-
terintuitive result arises because the client will only
consider her own loss from security breach when de-
ciding how much to invest in the protection. The loss
owing to system interdependency is orthogonal to the
client’s effort (i.e., ∂+j/∂qkj  ∂@/∂qkj). Therefore, the
client will underprotect her system, even if no com-
pensation is provided on security beach. By contrast,
the MSS provider will internalize the system interde-
pendency risk because its proﬁt is directly tied to the
security of every client. Hence, having full compen-
sation should be sufﬁcient to induce the MSS provider
to exert ﬁrst best efforts. This is similar to the case in
Section 3.
With threshold-based liability, the outsourcing cli-
ents will invest at least Tj effort to prevent the MSS
provider from shirking. By (31), the MSS provider will
choose βˆj  1 and exert the socially efﬁcient effort. Here
again, the client will not invest more than Tj effort
because, by (28), ∂u1j/∂qkj will become −∂#k/∂qkj < 0,
meaning that her utility is decreasing in effort. Hence,
theMSS provider will specify Tj  Q*ke in the contract to
force the client to choose the ﬁrst best effort, which
collectively leads to the socially optimal outcome. This
result is similar to the one from the basic model, except
that now the threshold is changed from Q*k to Q
*
ke to
account for the system interdependency risk.
Similarly, our analysis shows that the variable lia-
bility contract could also yield the socially optimal
outcome. We present the proof in the online appendix.
To sum up, our main ﬁndings from the baseline model
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are robust to accounting for system interdependency
risks. The following proposition summarizes the re-
sults with system interdependency.
Proposition 4. In the presence of system interdependency
risks, ﬁrst best social welfare is not achievable with a loss-
based liability contract. It is achievable with a threshold-
based liability contract with conditional full compensation or
a variable liability contract with the compensation rate equal
to the optimal-to-actual breach probability ratio capped at
100% (i.e., βj  min {@(a,Q*ke,Q*se)/@(a, qkj,Q*se), 1}).
5. Security Breach Scenarios
In practice, the MSS provider’s and the client’s efforts
may interact with each other. The efforts could be
complementary or substitutes, which lead to different
breach outcomes. In this section, we analyze the per-
formance of the bilateral liability-based contracts under
three common scenarios: total effort (Varian 2004,
Grossklags et al. 2008) and serial and parallel conﬁg-
urations (Lee et al. 2016). In the total effort scenario, the
client and the MSS provider are each responsible for
protecting a separate part of the client’s system. In
other words, their efforts do not interact with each
other. With a serial conﬁguration, the attacker needs to
penetrate both the client’s and the MSS provider’s
protection to compromise the system. Hence, their
protection efforts are substitutes. With a parallel con-
ﬁguration, the attacker needs to penetrate either the
client’s or the MSS provider’s protection to breach the
client’s system. Hence, their protection efforts are
complementary.
The total effort conﬁguration reﬂects a scenario
where the client and the MSS provider are applying
independent controls to protect the system (e.g., when
the system is partitioned). One example is when the
client outsources the protection of nonsensitive data to
the MSS provider and develops protection of sensitive
data herself. Another example is the protection of
mirrored systems (Grossklags et al. 2008). The MSS
provider would save copies of the client’s data and
propagate them through its content delivery network.
The usability, performance, and robustness of the entire
system depend on the security of each of the mirrors in
the network. One party’s bandwidth is independent of
the other party’s bandwidth, and therefore, the attacker
has to consume all bandwidths from all parties to
disrupt the service entirely.
With total effort conﬁguration, the breach function
depends on the weighted sum of the client’s and the
MSS provider’s efforts,
@(a, qk, qs)  a(1 − λkqk − λsqs), (32)
where λk and λs are the weights of protection for
the client and the MSS provider, with λk + λs  1, λk,
λs≠ 0. One characteristic of this conﬁguration is that
the marginal beneﬁt of protection is independent of the
other party’s effort (i.e., ∂2@/∂qkqs  0). This means
that even if one party shirks, the other party’s effort
will remain effective. Hence, the client will exert ﬁrst
best effort during in-house protection, although the
provider’s effort is missing, and hence, the overall
security is socially suboptimal. We compare the con-
tract performance by applying (32) and a quadratic
cost function (i.e., #k(qk)  ckq2k/2 and #s(qs)  csq2s/2)
to our baseline model in Section 3. The ﬁrst column
of Table 3 presents the outcomes. Both the threshold-
based liability contract and the variable liability contract
are efﬁcient, whereas the loss-based liability contract
is not.
With a loss-based liability contract, the optimal
compensation balances both parties’ protection
weights and unit costs. The optimal efforts are fractions
of the ﬁrst best efforts depending on the chosen com-
pensation rate. In general, when the MSS provider
has higher protection weight and cost advantage, the
compensation rate will exceed 50%, and the client
will shirk more than the MSS provider. For instance,
when software vulnerability assessment is outsourced
with a loss-based liability contract, the client-side
security testers may shirk because they expect that
the external testers will handle the job. However, the
external testers will also tend to shirk because they
do not bear the full liability for assessment failure. The
client-side testers will work hard only if they cannot
shift the blame to the MSS provider, which is the case
with a threshold-based liability contract or a variable
liability contract.
Interestingly, a loss-based liability contract is socially
efﬁcient under a speciﬁc scenario where the system is
partitioned and the system’s payoff is separable
(i.e., λkv if the client’s part is not breached and λsv if the
MSS provider’s part is not breached). In such a case, the
MSS provider should compensate λsv only if its part is
breached, which is essentially the full compensation.
With serial conﬁguration, the attacker needs to
penetrate both the client’s and the MSS provider’s
protection to compromise the system. Such a setting
applies when controls from both parties serve similar
purposes, such as the concept of “defense in depth,”
where the system is protected with multiple layers of
redundant security controls. For example, to defend
against phishing or malicious email attachments, the
client could use email ﬁltering services from the MSS
provider and install antivirus software on her own
system. To penetrate the client’s system, the attacker
would need to circumvent both the ﬁltering system from
the MSS provider and the antivirus software. However,
adding antivirus software on top of the ﬁltering system
has lower marginal beneﬁt than when the software is
used alone because the MSS provider’s ﬁltering system
should have already removed most malicious emails.
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Unlike total effort protection, the client’s and the
MSS provider’s security controls are dependent in a
serial conﬁguration. The breach probability
@(a, qk, qs)  a(1 − qk)(1 − qs). (33)
In particular, ∂2@/∂qkqs  ∂2@/∂qsqk  a, meaning that
the client’s and the MSS provider’s efforts are strategic
substitutes. This implies that the marginal beneﬁt from
protection decreases in the other party’s effort. In the
extreme case, when one party exerts full effort, the
other party will not need to do any protection because
the breach probability will be zero.
With (33), we compare the contract performance in
Table 3. A loss-based liability contract is again inefﬁcient,
whereas the variable liability contract and the threshold-
based liability contract yield ﬁrst best outcomes. To il-
lustrate this, we plot the variables from Table 3 with
different a and ck by ﬁxing v  100 and cs  1 in Figure 1.
In many cases, both parties will underinvest protec-
tion under a loss-based liability contract. This un-
derinvestment is more severe when one has some cost
disadvantage and the expected loss is high,whichmakes
the other party more efﬁcient in security protection.
To illustrate this inefﬁciency, consider a client adopt-
ing a cloud-based web application ﬁrewall (WAF) from
the MSS provider to fulﬁll the Payment Card Industry
Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) (Beaver 2011). The
clientmay undertake other controls to protect her system.
Because of expertise and experience, the MSS provider
is likely to be better in managing security controls. Our
result then suggests that because the client is less efﬁ-
cient than the MSS provider, it will more likely free ride
on the WAF under a loss-based liability contract. This
defeats the purpose of having redundant controls.
With parallel conﬁguration, the attacker needs to
penetrate either the client’s or the MSS provider’s pro-
tection to compromise the system. Realistically, a par-
allel conﬁguration may exist when the system is subject
tomultiple attack paths. For example, to secure sensitive
data in a system, the client could contract a network
intrusion detection system from the MSS provider and
introduce internal security policies, such as blocking
Table 3. Contract Performance Under Different Security Conﬁgurations
Breach function (cost
function) Total effort (quadratic) Serial conﬁguration (quadratic)
Parallel conﬁguration
(cubic)
Social planner’s problem
Client’s effort Q*k
λkav
ck
av(cs − av)
ckcs − (av)2
av
c2/3k c
1/3
s
MSS provider’s effort Q*s
λsav
cs
av(ck − av)
ckcs − (av)2
av
c1/3k c
2/3
s
Welfare W* (1 − a)v +
[(λkav)2
2ck
+ (λsav)
2
2cs
]
(1 − a)v + (av)
2(ck + cs − 2av)
2[ckcs − (av)2] (1 − a)v +
(av)3
3ckcs
Bilateral loss-based liability
Compensation rate β*
λ2s ck
λ2kcs + λ2s ck
Solution of
β*ck(cs − β*av)2  (1 − β*)cs[ck − (1 − β*)av]2
1
2
Client’s effort q*k (1 − β*)Q*k
(1 − β*)av(cs − β*av)
ckcs − β*(1 − β*)(av)2
Q*k
2
MSS provider’s effort q*s β
*Q*s
β*av[ck − (1 − β*)av]
ckcs − β*(1 − β*)(av)2
Q*s
2
Welfare loss W* − w* (λkλsav)
2
2(λ2kcs + λ2s ck)
No explicit expression
(av)3
6ckcsThreshold-based liability
Compensation rate β* 1qk ≥ λkavck 1qk ≥ av(cs−av)ckcs−(av)2 1qk ≥
av
c2/3k c
1/3
s
Client’s effort q*k
λkav
ck
av(cs − av)
ckcs − (av)2
av
c2/3k c
1/3
s
MSS provider’s effort q*s
λsav
cs
av(ck − av)
ckcs − (av)2
av
c1/3k c
2/3
s
Welfare loss W* − w* 0 0 0
Variable liability
Compensation rate β*
ckcs − (λ2kcs + λ2s ck)av
ckcs(1 − λkqk) − λ2s ckav
cs(ck − av)
[ckcs − (av)2](1 − qk)
ckcs − av
ckcs − c2/3k c1/3s avqk
Client’s effort q*k
λkav
ck
av(cs − av)
ckcs − (av)2
av
c2/3k c
1/3
s
MSS provider’s effort q*s
λsav
cs
av(ck − av)
ckcs − (av)2
av
c1/3k c
2/3
s
Welfare loss W* − w* 0 0 0
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USB ports to restrict data access. However, when one of
two controls is compromised, the attacker will gain full
access to the system.
In this scenario, the breach probability depends on
both parties’ efforts:
@(a, qk, qs)  a(1 − qkqs). (34)
The efforts are strategic complements here because ∂2@/
∂qkqs  ∂2@/∂qsqk  −a. Even if one party protects the
system fully, the breach probability will remain posi-
tive if the other party does not work hard. If one party
shirks, the protection will fail completely, and the
breach probability will become identical to the attack
rate. Hence, in-house protection becomes infeasible. The
client’s reservation utility is simply U*0  (1 − a)v.
We apply (34) and adopt a cubic cost function3 (i.e.,
#k(qk)  ckq3k/3 and #s(qs)  csq3s/3) into the baseline
model in Section 3. The results are shown in the last
column of Table 3. Both the threshold-based liability
contract and the variable liability contract are efﬁcient
with full compensation. The compensation rate in a
loss-based liability contract is always 50%, which
suggests that both parties should share the same
amount of liability, even if one party’s protection is less
cost-effective. This is because the security level in a
parallel conﬁguration is heavily inﬂuenced by the
weakest link, and setting equal liability couldminimize
this impact. Similarly, the client’s and the MSS pro-
vider’s efforts in a loss-based liability contract are al-
ways one-half of their corresponding ﬁrst best efforts.
In summary, the variable liability contract and
threshold-based liability contract always give the ﬁrst
best outcomes under different security conﬁgurations.
Loss-based liability contract does not perform as well
except in the total effort conﬁguration, where the sys-
tem can be partitioned and breaching the outsourced
part does not affect the in-house part. Table 4 sum-
marizes these results.
6. Limited Liability
In practice, the MSS provider often cannot fully com-
pensate for the value of a system to the client because the
system can worth billions of dollars (e.g., a bank’s
system may contain millions of credit-card numbers
and mission-critical transaction processing systems).
In practice, many providers set a liability limit up to
12months of the security service revenue (Overby 2012).
To examine how the bilateral liability-based contracts
Figure 1. Loss-Based Liability Contracts in Serial Conﬁguration
Note. Parameters: v  100, cs  1, @  a(1 − qk)(1 − qs).
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perform under such a limit, we introduce an exogenous
constraint that caps the compensation rate, γ∈ (0, 1).4
TheMSS provider would only offer a compensation rate
β between zero and γ. Referring to Propositions 2 and 3,
both the threshold-based liability contract and the var-
iable liability contract require full compensation to in-
duce ﬁrst best efforts. Therefore, the upper bound γ< 1
will immediately lead to inefﬁciency, as implied in
previous analyses (e.g., Lee et al. 2013).
The MSS provider often does not have full control of
the liability upper bound. Otherwise, it will simply set
γ  1 and provide full compensation to obtain the
maximum proﬁt. To reﬂect this constraint, we treat γ as
an exogenous variable. One explanation of this limited
liability is theMSS provider’s budget constraint—it can
afford to pay only a ﬁxed amount to each client because
the full outcome of the breach is simply unbearable. In
this case, the liability upper bound will equal γ, and
the compensation cap is γv. As one real-world example,
in IBM’s premiumMSS, the clients will be compensated
by up to $50,000 per month for any security breaches.
Another explanation of limited liability is client-side
budget constraint. As noted byOverby (2012), the service
price with unlimited liability (i.e., full compensation)
skyrockets, which discourages ﬁrms from outsourcing
their security operations, especially when the budget is
limited. Firms may negotiate for a lower price and ac-
cept the service only when the price is no greater than
a certain value (e.g., p≤φ). This setting is compatible
with the general liability upper bound γ∈ (0, 1) because
the service price is always set at such a level that u1 
U*0 to extract all surplus from the client. Speciﬁcally, by
rearranging the terms in Equation (7), the equilibrium
price is
p*  [1 −@(a, q*k, q*s)(1 − β*)]v − #k(q*k) −U*0, (35)
where q*k and q
*
s are functions of the compensation
rate β*. Therefore, the price is always a function of the
compensation rate (i.e., p* f (β*) for some function ).
If the price cap is φ, the liability upper bound will be
a function of the price cap or γ  f −1(φ). Hence, tech-
nically, imposing a price cap has the same effect as
imposing a limited liability.
One special case of limited liability is compensation
based on price, which is prevalent in practice as shown in
Table 1. Because the price is a function of compensation
rate, the liability upper bound will be the root of βv  p
with respect to β. Unlike a simple limited liability or
a price cap, the liability upper bound is always smaller
than one with price-based compensation. Otherwise, if
the compensation rate is one, the price should be set at
v to fulﬁll βv  p. From Equation (7), the client’s utility
from outsourcing u1 will then become nonpositive,
which cannot exceed the reservation utility U*0 ≥ 0.
In summary, we can consider limited liability as
a constraint on the compensation rate or the price. For
simplicity and without loss of generality, we model
limited liability by the compensation upper bound γ,
which is qualitatively similar to a price cap.
In general, the MSS provider’s problem is the same
as the social welfare maximization problem, with the
compensation rate being the key decision variable
max
β
[1 −@(a, qk(β), qs(β))]v − [#k(qk(β)) + #s(qs(β))],
(36)
where the efforts are functions of the compensation
rate. Suppose that the social welfare function in (36) is
quasiconcave in β, which is the case for the total effort,
serial, and parallel conﬁgurations. If the liability upper
bound is higher than the optimal compensation rate
(i.e., γ≥ β*), then theMSS providerwill simply choose β*.
Table 4. Summary of Security Outsourcing Scenario
Breach function (effort
interaction) Total effort (independent)
Serial conﬁguration (strategic
substitute)
Parallel conﬁguration (strategic
complement)
Sample scenarios Partition and outsource: outsource the
protection of a subsystem (e.g.,
nonsensitive data) and protect the
remaining part in house
Defense in depth: both parties apply
redundant controls to secure
a system
Multiple attack paths: security breach
occurs if either party’s security
control is compromised
Mirrored system: both parties
independently protect a mirrored
system (e.g., a website), and the
availability of this system depends
on total effort
Acquire and conﬁgure: the client
acquires a security appliance from
theMSS provider, which is effective
only if the client spends effort in
proper conﬁguration
Contract comparison
Bilateral loss-based
liability
Socially efﬁcient if the system can be
partitioned; inefﬁcient otherwise
Socially inefﬁcient: both parties shirk;
the party with cost-disadvantage
and high expected loss will shirk
more
Socially inefﬁcient: effort and social
welfare are halved
Threshold-based
liability
Socially efﬁcient Socially efﬁcient Socially efﬁcient
Variable liability Socially efﬁcient Socially efﬁcient Socially efﬁcient
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Otherwise, it will choose β  γ. Then its proﬁt maxi-
mization problem is governed by the ﬁrst-order con-
dition of (8) with β  γ; that is,
∂π
∂qs
−γ ∂@
∂qs
v − ∂#s
∂qs
 0. (37)
This additional constraint restricts the choice of qs(β)
in Equation (36), preventing the MSS provider from
choosing qs  Q*s because Equation (37) is different
from the ﬁrst-order condition in the social planner’s
problem, as stated in (3) when γ< 1. We deﬁne qk  Qsbk
and qs  Qsbs as the second best efforts, which are the
optimal efforts of the social welfare maximization
problem in (36) given that the MSS provider’s best
response is constrained by (37).
However, the client will maximize its utility given
the compensation rate, which should follow the ﬁrst-
order condition in (9). With a threshold-based liability
contract, this condition is not binding because the client
will exert effort at least at the threshold level to prevent
the MSS provider from shirking. The MSS provider can
choose qk(β) freely by a properly constructed threshold-
based liability contract. In particular, it can set T  Qsbk
to force the client to exert the second best effort. As
explained earlier, the client will not exert less than Qsbk
because otherwise the MSS provider will shirk. Also,
she will not exert more than Qsbk when the following
incentive compatibility condition holds:
∂u1
∂qk
∣∣∣∣∣
qkQsb+k
 (1 − γ) ∂qs
∂qk
∂@
∂qs
v + γ ∂@
∂qk
v≤ 0, (38)
which implies that further increasing effort from Qsbk
will decrease her utility. If Equation (38) does not hold,
Qsbk will not be the client’s equilibrium effort. Note that
as long as the client’s and theMSS provider’s efforts are
not strategic substitutes (i.e., ∂qs/∂qk ≥ 0), Equation (38)
will always hold.
With variable liability contract, we ﬁnd that the MSS
provider can still regulate the client’s effort with con-
ditional compensation. Therefore, similar to threshold-
based liability contract, the distortion is only initiated
from the underinvestment of the MSS provider. By con-
trast, the efforts will be further distorted in a multilateral
contract or a reverse insurance contract because the
MSS provider cannot fully regulate the client’s behavior
without a compensation linked to her effort (compare
with the bilateral liability-based contracts, where the
postbreach compensation to the client is directly linked
to her effort). Speciﬁcally, the client will maximize her
utility based on the ﬁrst-order condition
∂u1
∂qk
 −∂@
∂qk
v − ∂#k
∂qk
. (39)
Equation (39) is similar to the client’s problem in (9)
without the compensation from the MSS provider. It is
similar to the client’s problem in the ﬁrst best scenario
in (2). However, because of the distortion by the MSS
provider’s constraint (37), having this additional con-
straint would reduce welfare.
Intuitively, with the bilateral liability-based contracts,
the client’s effort is directly tied to the MSS provider’s
decision through the design of the compensation func-
tion. This facilitates the client to “work” with the MSS
provider in arriving at the second best outcome. With
multilateral or reverse insurance contracts, the client
does not receive any compensation after the breach.
Hence, her decision is detached from that of the MSS
provider, meaning that her effort will be distorted
from the second best.
In general, how the client reacts to limited liability
depends on the security setting. In a security operations
center where the state of security is obtained from or
shared with the MSS provider, the client may over-
invest in threat intelligence because protection efforts
are substitutes, and she knows that the MSS pro-
vider may underinvest because of the limited liability.
However, in systems with multiple access points (such
as the point-of-sale systems in the Target incident),
with limited liability, every party may underinvest in
protection because the efforts are complements. We
provide a detailed discussion of these breach scenarios
and the associated analysis in the online appendix.
To summarize, our analysis of limited liability sug-
gests that all liability-based contracts are socially in-
efﬁcient. This means that it is difﬁcult to achieve the ﬁrst
best outcome in the real world when there are liabil-
ity constraints or price caps. However, the bilateral
liability-based contracts (viz variable liability contract
and threshold-based liability contract) perform better
than third-party contracts, such as multilateral or re-
verse insurance contracts.
7. Discussion and Conclusions
Table 5 presents a high-level overview of the various
contracts considered in this paper. The two bilateral
liability-based contracts—threshold-based liability con-
tract and variable liability contract—are viable alter-
natives to the multilateral contract proposed in the
literature (Lee et al. 2013). Our ﬁndings can be ex-
tended to cases where there are interdependent clients
and apply to commonly used security control conﬁg-
urations. Furthermore, we critically assess the relative
performance of these contracts under real-world con-
straints, such as veriﬁcation errors and limited liability.
This research explains an intriguing discrepancy
between prior theoretical analysis and industry prac-
tice. In a setting involving collaborative service be-
tween a client and a service provider, it is difﬁcult to
incentivize both of them towork hardwhen effort is not
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contractible. Hence, we must add either a third party or
some uncertainty in the outcome function to facilitate
the choice of efﬁcient efforts (Mann and Wissink 1988,
Lee et al. 2013). However, as is evident in Table 1, none
of these solutions are deployed in the security industry.
Instead, the industrymostly uses bilateral contracts with
some compensation terms. The compensations are often
tied to customer behavior, implying that the service
providers expect to observe (at least partially) the clients’
effort after a security incident. Our research aligns the
theory and practice by proving that bilateral liability-
based contracts can indeed be efﬁcient when the effort
is veriﬁable after the breach.
Most importantly, we ﬁnd that this effort veriﬁcation
need not be complete. In fact, a threshold-base liability
contract (which does not require a full audit of the
client’s effort) performs even better than a variable li-
ability contract (which requires a detailed assessment
of the client’s effort) when postbreach effort veriﬁcation
is erroneous. Both of these contracts work better than
a multilateral (third-party) contract in the presence of
limited liability. These ﬁndings are novel, and they have
important implications for research. Although effort
veriﬁcation can address the underprovision prob-
lem in a collaborative setting (Cooper and Ross 1985,
Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine 1995, Lee et al. 2013), the
design of contract terms can have nuanced impacts on
efﬁciency in the real world. Our ﬁndings should re-
vitalize the interest in studying the design of IT service
contracts amid the proliferation of collaborative in-
novations, such as internet of things or Blockchain-
based industry consortia (Iansiti and Lakhani 2017).
Practically, this study suggests that we should pro-
mote bilateral liability-based contracts when postbreach
effort veriﬁcation is practicable. In reality,MSS providers
often provide periodic audit reports on their service
quality (van der Walt 2003). In banking, the Federal
Financial Institutions Examinations Council, which over-
sees information security practices in ﬁnancial institutions,
recommends detailed and comprehensive assessment
and management of MSS risks, including the right to
audit and monitor MSS providers.5 These auditing ini-
tiatives focus on service providers, which may not be
the party suffering the main consequences of a security
breach. Hence, unique to the MSS setting where col-
laborative protection is important, we think that auditing
the client’s contribution should receive more attention
when the contract stipulates compensation from theMSS
provider to the client.
Indeed, the payment card industry engages qualiﬁed
security assessors to check client ﬁrms’ compliance
with the PCI DSS. Development of new technologies,
such as Blockchain, that facilitate the storage of tamper-
proof data and immutable security logs (Cucurull and
Puiggali 2016) would certainly help propel such client-
side effort veriﬁcation forward.
The efﬁciency of the bilateral liability-based contracts
depends on the quality of the postbreach veriﬁcation.
Obviously, there are challenges in auditing effort. For
example, it is not easy to deﬁne the scope, manage the
costs, and agree on the key determinants on compliance
with the PCI DSS (Rees 2012). Many audit processes
rely on data sampling to determine past actions. Such
sampling could introduce errors owing to, for exam-
ple, omission and mismeasurement. When auditing or
postbreach veriﬁcation error is unavoidable, we sug-
gest using a threshold-based liability contract. The
MSS provider can estimate the potential range of audit
errors and incorporate it in the threshold to incentivize
efﬁcient effort from the client. Variable liability contract
will mostly not yield efﬁcient efforts here.
We also ﬁnd that the provision of limited liability
makes all contracts, including the multilateral contract,
inefﬁcient. The question, then, is why such provision is
often made, especially when it hurts the MSS pro-
vider’s proﬁt. We believe that it is because in reality, the
client’s loss may extend well beyond the actual loss in
the system. For example, there could be litigation costs
Table 5. Contract Comparison
Contract
Bilateral loss-based
liability
Threshold-based
liability Variable liability Third-party contracts
Socially efﬁcient No Yes Yes Yes
Minimum number of parties in
the contract
2 2 2 3
Observability of the breach
event
Required Required Required Required
Receiver of breach
compensation
The breached client The breached client The breached client Some third party (e.g., other
client)
Audit of breached client’s effort Not required Required: check if effort
exceeds a threshold
Required: check all
efforts
Not required
Additional clause to address the
presence of interdependency
risk
Penalize the breached client No additional action
needed
Introduce 100%
limited liability
Penalize the breached client
Distortions caused by limited
liability
MSS provider and client:
constraints (9) and (10)
MSS provider only:
constraint (37)
MSS provider only:
constraint (37)
MSS provider and client:
constraints (37) and (39)
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from consumers (including the loss of productivity,
breach of personal information, and identity theft),
opportunity losses caused by suspension of service,
and reputation losses. In our model, we subsume all of
these losses in v, in which case then it will be difﬁcult
for the MSS provider to shoulder all of these liability.
Even if theMSS provider is willing to bear all liability, it
will likely set an extremely high price that is not ac-
ceptable to the client because most client ﬁrms tend
to underestimate the consequences of cyberattacks
(Lloyd’s 2017). For these reasons, limited liability will
likely prevail. Our research shows that the bilateral
liability-based contracts are more efﬁcient than mul-
tilateral contracts in the presence of limited liability,
but they are not fully efﬁcient either. Future research
should explore other efﬁcient contracts in this context.
Before we can resolve the limited liability problem
using contractual solutions, the client may enhance her
protection using cyber insurance (Lloyd’s 2017). For
example, she can separate assets into different clusters
and collaborate with the MSS provider to control some
well-deﬁned risks. She can cover other clusters’ risks by
cyber insurance. This is akin to the setting of total effort
conﬁguration analyzed in Section 5. However, better
transparency on risk exposure could also alleviate the
problem caused by limited liability. Top-tier MSS pro-
viders today possess state-of-the-art systems to track
attacks at a global scale. We encourage the sharing of
such intelligence so that all parties are better informed
about risk exposure. Information sharing can reduce
overall security risks through more investments in
security (Gal-Or and Ghose 2005). In our case, the in-
efﬁciency resulting from price distortion could be min-
imized when all parties are better informed about the
overall risk exposure.
There are several limitations in our study. First, we
analyze amonopolyMSS. This is a common assumption
in the literature for the ease of tractability, but it is re-
strictive. Future research should extend the analysis to
an oligopoly. Second, we treat information security as
a single service. In reality, there are different security
services, such as prevention, detection, and real-time
incident response. Not all of these services involve
collaborative efforts. Furthermore, it may not be optimal
to outsource all security services to a single MSS pro-
vider (Cezar et al. 2014). Future research should consider
a more ﬂexible model that can accommodate separate
security controls with different levels of collaboration
between the MSS provider and the client.
Finally, other forms of information asymmetry exist.
The MSS provider may overstate the client’s risk to
sway the client into purchasing more protection than
needed. The client may not have the ability to judge
whether the provider’s advice is accurate, which has
been seen in other settings, such as software develop-
ment (Jayanth et al. 2011) and medical services (Dulleck
and Kerschbamer 2006). Future research should consider
the optimal contract design in these related settings.
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Endnotes
1The proofs of all results are available in the online appendix.
2The only exceptional case for Equation (15) to evaluate to a constant
(which is the necessary condition for the variable liability contract to
be efﬁcient) is when @[G(qk) − G(qk − a)] is independent of qk . This
could happen in some limited functional forms for @( · ) and G( · ),
and even so, they have to follow some restricted parametric forms.
This seems highly unlikely in the real world.
3We consider a cubic cost function for the parallel conﬁguration
because a quadratic cost function will lead to zero ﬁrst best efforts,
meaning that everyone should not protect the system. Lee et al. (2016)
also use different cost functions when analyzing the serial and
parallel conﬁgurations.
4We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting the analysis of
limited liability.
5Please refer to the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council's
(FFIEC) website for details: http://ithandbook.fﬁec.gov/it-booklets/
outsourcing-technology-services/appendix-d-managed-security-service-
providers/mssp-examination-procedures.aspx.
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